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LIST OF PARTIES 
All parties to the appeal are shown on the case 
caption. 
A Motion to Dismiss as against the defendant, Mildred 
Snow, was granted by the trial court. No appeal was taken from 
that order by any party. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMES ARDEN HILL, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. ; 
SAND I H. AMEND (nka SNOW), ) 
ANNE GUBLER (nka DeARDEN) ] 
and MILDRED SNOW, ] 
Defendants/Appellants. ) 
i Case No. 940766-CA 
1 Oral Argument 
i Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court entered September 27, 1994 denying the 
appellants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding a Jury Verdict that 
was returned June 10, 1994 and the judgment entered on that verdict 
on June 15, 1994. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme 
Court by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j ) . As authorized by §78-2-
2(4), the Supreme Court transferred the case to The Court of 
Appeals by order entered December 15, 1994. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the evidence presented by the appellee is 
sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury that the statements 
made by the appellants were defamatory as a matter of law. 
2. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
verdict of the jury that the plaintiff sustained monetary damages. 
3. Whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff is 
sufficient to sustain a verdict by the jury that the plaintiff is 
entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law. 
For each of these issues, the standard of review is 
"clear and convincing evidence." (See MUJI 10.1). The issues were 
preserved in the trial court by Motion for Directed Verdict (TR 
386) and by written Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
Index item 58, P. 224-225). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Defendants are not aware of any constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the issues on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. This is a civil action sounding 
in defamation. 
b. Course of Proceedings. The plaintiff filed his 
complaint on April 2, 1991. Each of the defendants denied that any 
statements made by any of them were defamatory in nature and 
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affirmatively asserted that any statements made were true. (Index 
Item 23, P. 86-88) The case was tried to a jury on June 9 and 10 
of 1994, and a verdict was returned on June 10, 19 94. Judgment was 
entered on that verdict on June 15, 1994. 
c. Disposition in Trial Court. A Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict was filed by the 
defendants/appellants Sandi H. Amend (nka Snow) and Anne Gubler 
(nka DeArden) on June 22, 1994. (Index Item 58, 224-225). Oral 
arguments were heard by the court in support of this Motion on 
September 7, 1994. (Sept. 7, 1994, TR page 10-14) The trial 
court's written order denying that motion was entered September 27, 
1994. (Index Item 66, P. 253-255) From that order, this appeal is 
taken. Notice of Appeal was filed with the District Court October 
21, 1994. (Index Item 67, P. 256-258) 
d. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for 
Review. At the time this action was commenced in April of 1991, 
the plaintiff was a resident of Gunnison, Utah. (TR. 104, 307, 
351) The defendants were residents of Minnesota and Wisconsin. (TR 
181) Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendants have 
made malicious and slanderous statements to third parties about the 
plaintiff that have damaged him in excess of $100,000.00, together 
with punitive damages in an unspecified amount. (Index Item 2, P. 
14-26) 
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After disposition of defendants Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction, they answered the plaintiffs complaint on 
January 6, 1992, (Index Item 308, P. 118-120) The affirmative 
defense of truth was asserted. 
The case was tried to a jury sitting in Sanpete County on 
June 10 and 11 of 1994. At that trial, the plaintiff called eight 
witnesses and offered seven exhibits that were received. 
Of the seven witnesses called by the plaintiff, only two of 
them testified to any direct conversations or communications with 
either of the appellants. Witness Nancy Houston testified that on 
or about April 6, 1990, she received a telephone call from Sandi 
Amend (nka Snow) wherein the latter advised the witness that, She 
then told me that she wanted to alert me to the fact that charges 
were being brought against Mr. Hill and that it was important that 
I be aware of this. (Trans. P. 271, L. 17) The witness further 
stated, She, urn, talked further about his relationship with his 
children and the fact that he was being charged with inappropriate 
behavior with his children. She referred to his being in our 
financial office suggesting that there might be some financial 
impropriety as well." (Trans. P. 272, Lines 5-9). The witness 
went on to say, I again reaffirmed my support for Jim and we 
closed the conversation. " (Trans. P. 272, Line 10) 
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This witness was a coworker with the respondent at the 
Waterford Institute for a number of years. (Trans. P. 268, Lines 
9-10) She is also married to the plaintiffs former employer. 
This witness was then asked by the plaintiff this 
question: Did you have any other telephone calls or contacts from 
Sandi Amend? Witness, answer: Not that I recall." (Trans. P. 
273, L. 16-18) 
This witness went on to testify concerning a letter that 
was received by them. The testimony is quoted as follows:1 We then 
received a letter from Ms. Gubler which I would like to suggest is 
appropriate to read at this point. May I do so? " (Trans. P. 274, 
L. 5-7) The letter was received into evidence as Exhibit No. 12 and 
was read to the jury upon instructions of the court. It reads as 
follows: 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Houston: 
As a friend of the Hill children I write 
to you not to take sides along some battle 
lines, but for the sake of the children. 
Adults may do to each other whatever they 
agree to do, but children have the right to 
our protection and our support. Thats the 
least we can do as good Christians. 
I understand from the Hill children that 
you have firmly indicated would be the 
character witnesses for their father, Jim 
Hill. The issue here is not how many 
character witnesses he can accumulate, but 
rather did he or did he not sexually molest 
his children? It is not his character that is 
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being called into question, but his sexual 
preferences. If you can testify concerning 
those, you may find yourself in a rather 
embarrassing position. If you know through 
personal knowledge that he has not molested 
his children and really have the welfare of 
the children as your main concern, then I hope 
you would consider what would be best for them 
and truly try to help them. If you dont know 
the truth about the sexual molestation, then I 
suggest you get out. You realize your social 
status, political pull and financial support 
may sway the decision and further damage his 
children, we who have no such sugar daddies? 
Thats a very heavy price to pay unless you 
have first-hand knowledge of the situation. 
Do you realize that it is his own sons 
who are bringing the charges against him? 
What would they possibly stand to gain by 
pursuing it if it werent true? Dont you 
think they know that they stand to lose his 
child support money as a result of this 
action? For your sakes, please dont get 
involved in something that could have profound 
and long lasting effects on some beautiful 
children. 
How he appears to be at work has very 
little relationship to how he is in the 
privacy of his home. It would seem to me that 
anyone in your position would want to 
carefully investigate both sides of the issue 
before testifying in a manner that an employer 
would generally know so little about. 
Your best regards. 
Signed, Anne Gubler. (Trans. P. 276-278, starting at 
Line 23 on 276) 
This witness was then questioned by the plaintiff as 
follows: 
o 
Mr. Hill: Q. Do you have confidence in Mr. Hill? 
Witness: A. Complete. 
Q. Even after having received these communications, did 
you still have confidence in Mr. Hill? 
A. My admiration for him doubled. ... (Trans. P. 279, 
Lines 21-23) 
On cross-examination by counsel for defendants, the 
following dialog took place: 
Q. Okay. His relationship I take it had nothing to do 
with or — or his termination had nothing to do with any 
relationship between you and him. You would be proud to have him 
stay? 
A. Absolutely not. We would have been delighted to 
have had the services continue. 
Q. You didnt make any attempt to shun him or to avoid 
him or hold him in contempt or anything of that nature as a result 
of these statements? 
A. That could not be further from the truth. (Trans. 
P. 285, Lines 10-19) 
At page 286, starting at line 12, this witness was 
questioned further as follows: 
Q. Okay. You say in your memorandum: I responded to 
whatever her purpose is in calling me. I wanted her to know that 
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Jim had told us of the charges. Is that true? 
A. Yes, Jim had told us of the charges. 
Q. In other words, you already knew the things that she 
was telling you. 
A. We knew the things she was telling us. 
Q. And then she was warning you about the 
ramifications? 
A. The ramifications of the charges being proven. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Right. 
Q. She didnt tell you the charges had been proven, did 
she? 
A. No, she did not say. 
Q. Because they hadnt been. 
A. Thats right. (Trans. P. 286-287, beginning at 
Line 12 on 286) 
The letter identified by the witness, Nancy Houston, that 
is quoted above is the only communication of any kind attributed to 
the defendant, Anns Gubler (nka DeArden). 
The only witness to testify concerning any communications 
from the defendant, Sandi H. Amend (nka Snow) was presented by the 
witness, Dustin Houston, who testified that he is chairman of an 
organization called Waterford Institute which was formed to develop 
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materials to help urban and rural poor children through use of new 
technology. (Trans. P. 289, Line 20-25) He further testified that 
the plaintiff was employed in many capacities by that institute 
since the early 1980s. (Trans. P. 290, Lines 8-14) He testified 
that about the same time his wife received the telephone call that 
she testified to, he received a similar call from one of the 
defendants whom he said, I believe it was Sandi (Trans. P. 295, 
Line 24) wherein he testified to the following statements: 
The woman said that she thought very highly of the 
Waterford Institute and knew that it was — did a lot of important 
work and had a school associated with it with children and wanted 
me to be aware, urn, Mr. Hill was involved in the sexual abuse of 
the children and therefore in this pseudo friendly voice, said, I 
just want you to be aware that you are positioning somebody to 
damage a lot of children and in your responsibility you should be 
aware of that and urn, that was, urn, I responded by indicating that 
I had great faith in you — in Mr. Hill, and that we had seen him 
in good times and bad, and that he, urn, had our full confidence and 
trust and indeed, I would entrust my own children with him. 
(Trans. P. 298-299, Lines 1-12) 
The foregoing is the extent of the testimony concerning 
conversations with either of the defendants. 
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SUMMARY Q~ THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence is insuificient for the finder of fact to 
conclude that any statements published by either of the defendants 
was defamatory as a matter of law. 
The record is void of any evidence supporting the 
plaintiffs allegations that he suffered any pecuniary damages. 
In the absence of pecuniary loss, the court cannot 
support a finding of punitive damages as a matter of law. 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed 
verdict made at the close of all the evidence 
is denied or for any reason is not granted, 
the court is deemed to have submitted the 
action to the jury subject to a later 
determination of the legal questions raised by 
the motion. Not later than ten days after 
entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a 
directed verdict may move to have the verdict 
and any judgment entered thereon set aside and 
to have judgment entered in accordance with 
his motion for a directed verdict; ... if a 
verdict was returned, the court may allow the 
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment 
and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed. If no verdict was 
returned, the court may direct the entry of 
judgment !xs if the requested verdict had been 
directed, r may order a new trial. 
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"(c) Same, Conditional Rulings on Grant of 
Motion. (1) If the Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict provided for in 
subdivision (b) of this rule is granted, the 
court shall also rule on the Motion for a New 
Trial, if any, by determining whether it 
should be granted if the Judgment is 
thereafter vacated or reversed and shall 
specify the grounds for granting or denying 
the Motion for a New Trial ..." 
This rule was obviously designed to encourage the 
submission of controversial issues to a jury whenever there is any 
doubt about the matter. This permits determination on the merits 
which is more conclusive and eliminates the necessity of ruling on 
the question as a matter of law. Smith v. Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 
378 P.2d 541. 
The function of this rule is to permit the trial judge to 
submit the case to the jury for their determination. Then, if the 
verdict goes adverse to the moving party, he can, when there is 
more time for deliberation, re-examine and rule on whether a jury 
question exists. Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d 193, 234 P.2d 855 (1953). 
Addressing the motion of defendant, Sandi Amend (nka Snow) 
Element No. 5 of the cause of action as set out in Jury 
Instruction No. 19 provided as follows: 
"By a preponderance of the evidence that as a 
proximate result of the publication of the 
materially false and defamatory statement, the 
plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss or if no 
pecuniary loss was suffered, the nature of the 
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materially false and defamatory statement as 
defamatory per se. 
Jury Instruction No. 2 3 provided as follows: 
The fourth essential element of plaintiffs 
case requires the plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
materially false and defamatcry statement of 
and concern'ng the plaintiff was the proximate 
cause of pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or 
that the nature of the statement was libelous 
per se. 
Pecuniary loss is not associated with 
emotional distress or any general implied or 
presumed damage, but is that loss which is 
actual, such as a loss of income or some other 
readily or easily quantifiable amount. Not 
all losses of money qualify for pecuniary 
losses for these purposes. For example, money 
spent for psychiatric care is not such a 
pecuniary loss, only those damages of a 
readily and easily quantifiable amount that 
are attributed to the actions of third persons 
may constitute pecuniary loss for these 
purposes. Also, loss of income is not a 
pecuniar; ±oss for purposes herein unless that 
loss is attributed to the actions of third 
persons. Loss of income created by feelings 
of grief, sadness, anger or otherwise that may 
have inhibited the plaintiffs capability or 
desire to work or not, as such, pecuniary 
losses for these purposes. 
For a statement to be libelous per se, it must 
be comprised of language which by its nature 
necessarily must or presumably will as a 
natural and proximate cause occasion the 
plaintiff pecuniary loss. (Index Item 22, P. 
173-215) 
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Libel is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, 
as follows: 
To defame or injure a persons reputation by a 
published writing. 
In the case of this defendant, there was no writing at 
all, only a phone call. There is no evidence of pecuniary loss of 
any kind. (TR. 104, 115, 141) All the plaintiff testified to were 
attorneys fees incurred in defending the legal actions pending 
against him in the State of Minnesota that have nothing to do with 
this defendant except that her husband, witness Bryan Snow, who 
testified he has physical custody of three of the respondents 
minor children who are placed in the legal custody of the State of 
Minnesota authorities by a Minnesota court. (Testimony of Sandi H. 
Amend (nka Snow), Trans. P. 308-309, commencing 308, line 8 to 309, 
Line 16) In any case, attorneys fees are not generally considered 
to be damages and especially in this case they should not be. 
All Statements Made By This Defendant Were True 
The only statement testified to came from the testimony 
of Nancy Houston and this defendant. Essentially, she testified 
that this appellant told her that she was calling to alert her to 
the fact that the plaintiff had been accused in the State of 
Minnesota with sexually molesting his children. According to the 
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evidence, that statement turned out to be absolutely true. (TR. 
267-287) 
Dustin Houston testified that he, too, received a 
telephone call that went further than the statement that his wife 
testified to in that accusations were actually made by the caller 
to the same effect. This witness, however, wasnt sure to whom he 
was talking. This evidence as a matter of law should not be found 
to rise to the level of clear and convincing, or even 
preponderance, in favor of the plaintiff against this appellant. 
(TR- 289-297, 303-304) 
Addressing the Motion of Defendant Anne Gubler (nka DeArden) 
The only communication concerning the plaintiff that is 
attributable to this defendant is the letter delivered to the 
witnesses Dustin and Nancy Houston. There is absolutely nothing in 
that letter that makes any factual statement that could be 
considered to be defamatory. (Exhibit 12) 
Jury Instruction No. 20, which I think accurately states 
the law, was given to the jury by the Court as follows: 
The first essential element of plaintiffs 
case requires the plaintiff to prove by 
evidence that the publication contained a 
materially false statement of fact. A 
statement that is incapable of factual 
determination is not a statement of fact, even 
if it is annoying, embarrassing or reflects 
upon the plaintiffs reputation or uses 
inflammatory, caustic and irritating terms. 
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The statement to be true needs not be 
absolutely, totally or literally true. 
Substantial truth is all that is required. 
Any statement contained in that letter that can be 
construed in any way to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff 
was established to be absolutely true. The only significant 
statement of fact contained in that letter was the statement: Do 
you realize that it is his own sons who are bringing the charges 
against him? His son, Bryan Snow, testified to the effect that he 
was the one who initiated the proceedings in Minnesota. (TR. P. 
216, L.10-13) 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that there is 
anything in that letter that could be construed to e libelous, 
there was no pecuniary damage suffered as that term was defined in 
the Jury Instruction No. 23. It certainly doesnt rise to the 
level of definition of libelous per se as that term v/as defined by 
the Court in Instruction No. 20. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In summary, there was no statement (s) made by the 
defendant, Sandi Amend (nka Snow) that were not true and even if 
determined by the jury to be untrue, were not damaging in any 
pecuniary way; nor were they libelous per se because they were not 
libelous at all according to the law dictionary definition of that 
term. 
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With reference to the defendant Anne Gubler (nka 
DeArden), the letter sent to the witnesses Houstons by this 
appellant contained very little, if any, statements of facts 
against the plaintiff; and any such statements that could be 
construed to be statements of fact were established to be true. 
Truth is an absolute defense. For the most part, the letter can be 
construed only as one encouraging these witnesses to think twice 
before they came to the Minnesota proceedings to be character 
witnesses for the plaintiff. Again, there was no pecuniary loss 
established, and as a matter of law, this was not libelous per se. 
CONCLUSION 
The Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict 
as against the defendant Sandi H. Amend (nka Snow) should have been 
granted, and the order denying that motion should be reversed; or 
in the alternative, a new trial should be ordered. 
The Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict 
as against the defendant Anne Gubler (nka DeArden) should likewise 
have been granted, and the order denying that motion should be 
reversed; or in the alternative, a new trial should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted this 7/& day of April, 1995. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Appellants 
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A D D E N D U M 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. / Q 
Because of the First Amendment, the burden of proof upon 
the plaintiff in this case is greater than in the ordinary case. 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must prove the essential elements of the 
plaintiff's case merely by a preponderance of the evidence. 
"Preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of the 
evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed 
to it, is more convincing as to its truth. 
In this defamation case, however, the plaintiff has the 
greater burden of proving portions of the plaintiff's case by 
"clear and convincing evidence." To prove something by "clear and 
convincing evidence" requires more and greater evidence, not 
necessarily in terms of quantity of witnesses — but in terms of 
quality of persuasion, than to prove something by a "preponderance 
of the evidence." Such evidence must be so compelling as to leave 
no substantial doubt in your mind to the contrary. For a matter to 
be clearly and convincingly proved, it must have at least reached 
the point where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to 
the correctness of the conclusion. Clear and convincing proof 
carries with it not only the power t- persuade as to probable truth 
or correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but also has the 
element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and 
convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only probable to 
the mind. 
In addition, to be clearly and convincingly persuaded, 
the underlying facts must be clearly and convincingly proved. 
Testimony of facts that are not distinctly remembered and not 
narrated exactly and in order cannot clearly and convincingly prove 
a fact. To be clear and convincing evidence, the facts to which 
the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; details must 
be narrated exactly and in order; the testimony must be clear, 
direct and weighty; and the.witnesses must be lacking confusion as 
to the facts at issue. Even if the witness distinctly remembers 
facts and precisely narrates them, you must still determine if the 
evidence is so compelling as to leave no serious or substantial 
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. 
Whenever in these instruction it is stated that the 
burden, or the burden of proof, rests upon a certain party to prove 
a certain allegation made by that party by "clear and convincing 
evidence," you shall find that the allegation is not true where the 
evidence may preponderate in favor of the truth of an allegation 
made by a party but the allegation has not been "clearly and 
convincingly" proved. 
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that letter constitute libel per se by any means. In fac 
I don't think they constitute libel at all. 
But as far as Sandy is concerned, Libel per 
se--yeah, libel per se doesn't apply and nobody--and 
counsel, nobody testified concerning any monetary damages 
So element No. 4 of the cause of action is nonexistent. 
THE COURT: Well, there is some evidence to th 
effect that he spent attorneys fees and— 
MR. WOOTTON: Attorneys fees aren't damages, a. 
they? 
THE COURT: They can be. They can be damages : 
this. The motion is denied. Anything else? 
MR. WOOTTON: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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 II CHAMBERS PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED 
THE COURT: We are back on the record. The 
jury's not present, but counsel are present. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
BY MR. WOOTTON: . The defendants jointly move fc. 
a directed verdict in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff for cause of action on the plaintiff's 
complaint. I do that because I think I have to do that as 
prerequisite for making a motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, if that becomes necessary. Tr 
1 |!
 bases for the motion are the same as the bases for the 
2
 II motion to dismiss, 
3
 I THE COURT: The record may so show. 
WOOTTON: Thank you, 
5
 II THE COURT: The motion is denied. 
6
 Anything else? 
7
 MR. HILL: I don't have anything, 
3 THE COURT: Anything else? 
9
 MR. WOOTTON: I don't have anything. 
10 MR. HILL: No. 
11 || EXCEPTIONS TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1 2 II THE COURT: Let's stay on the record. 
!3 II The record should indicate that I've been with 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
counsel and have gone over the proposed instructions. I've 
15
 examined the requests for a examinations and have basically 
given all instructions requested,, as near as I can tell, 
plus I modified a couple that I thought should go in. 
You may now take your exceptions, if you have 
any. First, do you have any exceptons to my instructions? 
MR. HILL: No. 
THE COURT: Do you have any exceptions? 
22
 || MR. WOOTTON: The defendants have no exceptions. 
23
 || THE COURT: The record may so show 
24 
25 
Okay. We'll just wait and as soon as Joe can get 
those, we'll put it in. 
\ 
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NOALL T. WOOTTON — #3554 
Attorney for Defendants 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 727 
American Fork, UT 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNT, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ARDEN HILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDI H. AMEND (nka SNOW), 
•ANNE GUBLER (nka DEARDEN), 
and MILDRED SNOW, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT 
Case No. 9865 
Pursuant to Rule 5 0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the 
defendants Sandi H. Amend (n/k/a Snow) and Anne Gubler (n/k/a 
DeArden) respectfully move the Court for an Order granting judgment 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff no right to 
recover notwithstanding the jury verdict to the contrary. 
Defendants move to have the verdict and any judgment entered 
thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with 
this motion. Each of the defendants move for a new trial in the 
alternative. 
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The defendant, Sandi H. Amend (n/k/a Snow), moves for a 
new trial on her counterclaim. 
This motion is supported by the attached Statement of 
Points and Authorities. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of June, 1994. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this TIZncA day of June, 19 94, a 
true and accurate copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT 
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT was mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
James Arden Hill 
P.O. Box 1357 
Orem, UT 84059 
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NOALL T. WOOTTON -- #3554 
Attorney for Defendants 
8 North Center Street 
P.O. Box 727 
American Fork, UT 84003-0727 
Telephone: (801) 756-3576 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNT, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ARDEN HILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDI H. AMEND (nka SNOW), 
ANNE GUBLER (nka DEARDEN) , 
and MILDRED SNOW, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT 
Case No. 9865 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Don Tibbs, Judge of the above court, on September 7, 
1994 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. The plaintiff appeared in person. 
The defendants Sandi H. Amend (nka Snow) and Anne Gubler (nka 
DeArden) appeared through Noall T. Wootton, their attorney of 
record. The matter -'- before the court on the Motion of the two 
defendants referred to for an order granting their motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury that was returned 
June 10, 1994. Judgment was entered on that jury verdict on June 
15, 1994. The motion now before the court was filed within the 
time allowed by law and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 50 of 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is supported by a Statement 
of Points and Authorities pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501 
of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Oral arguments were 
presented in support of the defendants' motion by counsel and 
opposing arguments were presented by the plaintiff. The Court 
having reviewed the evidence and the arguments of the parties and 
having considered the evidence and the law, now, therefore, enters 
the following: 
ORDER 
The motion of the defendants Sandi H. Amend (nka Snow) 
and Anne Gubler (nka DeArden) should be and the same is hereby 
denied. 
The motion of the defendants for a new trial is denied. 
This is intended by the court to be a final order under 
the provisions of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this 2TJ day of September, 1994. 
BY-THE COURT: 
% V V ' • ••< J 
DD=: 
JUDGE DON.TIBBS 
Sixth District Court 
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T^---hepefcry certify that on this ?f^h day of September, 
1994, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING 
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